



Context is all. Hence a word of explanation about why I provided this commentary at a Law and
Literature symposium,jointly sponsored by United States andAustralian organizations.' The conveners
invited me because, a few years earlier, Carolyn Heilbrun and I had co-authored an essay 2 in which
we discussed the development, in the United States, of courses about law and literature in law
schools and the growing set of related commentaries, most of which neither addressed feminist
thought nor incorporated feminist concerns. When asked to participate in the 1995 conference 'as
a feminist' and assigned a position on a panel entitled 'Feninisms: The View from Australia and the
United States', it seemed plain that the task was to revisit the issues that we had considered in the late
1980s, and to see if and how the world of either law within the academy, law outside the academy, or
'law and literature' had changed.
The battle for voice - for the authority to describe, at times with narrative power - is painful
at this moment in the United States. Below, I sketch three contexts in which such voice is in issue:
in legal doctrine, in the systems of courts themselves, and in the world denominated'law and literature'.
In all three, women have asserted alternative conceptions. In each of these settings, that claimed
space is contested, and in each, a conflict exists about who has authority to shape the contours of
discussion. As women make visible a distinctive array of experiences and then gain power to alter
laws and reframe contexts, counterclaims of neutrality and timeless truths attempt to quiet these
voices and diminish their power.
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. 'Changing the Topic' was presented in the
Panel, Feininsms:The View from Australia and the United States, Law and Literature Symposium, Berkeley, California, USA,
Oct. 1, 1995. My thanks to Dennis Curtis, Carolyn Heilbrun,Vicki Jackson, Rosemary Lemmis, Nancy Marder, Kelley
Poleynard, Ramona Ripston, Linda Thomas, and Barrie Thorne for their help and friendship. Thanks also to Stanley Fish,
whose presentation at a seminar at the University of Southern California prompted some of these thoughts. All rights
reserved;Judith Resnick.
Law and Literature Symposium, sponsored by the Law & Humanities Institute, the Law and Literature Association of
Australia, and the University of California, Berkeley, 30 September-2 October 1995, Berkeley, Cahfornia.
Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik, 'Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism' (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1913.
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A. THE WORLD OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
One way to tell the story of doctrinal developments, circa 1996 in the United States, is that women
have successfully told 'stories'- been heard, sometimes individually and sometimes in the aggregate
- within law. Take, for example, the recognition of the right to be free from sexual harassment while
working. For years, women were supposed to understand either that sexual advances were a part of
the terms and conditions of employment or, if the aggression was sufficiently insistent, that perhaps
the criminal law or the law of torts might respond to an individual instance of wrongdoing.
Within the last decades, however, has emerged a story of cumulative experiences too frequent
to deny. Women are slowly starting to reshape the prior version, to move from being the object of
the gaze to reporting what women see, experience, and think - and to imagining alternatives. And
slowly (sometimes, it seems excruciatingly slowly), women have begun to make their views heard, in
the academy, in reported opinions of judges, in the shape and structure of decision making.'
Those experiences have pushed law in this particular context to generate something called a
legal right against sexual harassment. This is, like all of law's reforms, by no means perfect. One finds
the problematic incorporation of the mores of rape law and a focus on the victim of the harassment,
as inquiries are made about whether the plaintiff'welcomed' the harassment,
4 what she wore, whether
her behavior was 'ladylike', whether she willingly participated, whether she purposefully seduced,
and the like.' But nevertheless, there it is: women's law in the making. Judges and juries have found
or upheld liability of employers and supervisors, and some institutions have altered their policies and
practices to attend to the problems of sexualised oppression within work places. We might rightly
celebrate a sense of place, of voice, of power.
But now, in the second decade of this work, the tone is changing; other claims are being made
about this body of law. One case serves as exemplary. A woman, Lois Robinson, alleged a Title VII
violation, that she was discriminated against at work because she was a woman. Ms. Robinson was
one of very few 'female skilled craftsworkers'; that is, a woman welder.6 Over the ten years of her
employment, she was promoted from 'third class welder', to 'second class welder', to 'first class
welder' 'While employed over those ten years, she also suffered a barrage of injuries.
A parallel effort, to turn attention toward women's experiences oflaw's limits, is examined by Regina Graycar in this
journal, 'Teling Tales: Legal Stories aboutViolence Against Women' (1996) 7 Australian Feminist Liw Journal. On the
problems of gaining attention for such issues, see Hilary Astor, 'The Weight of Silence:Talking aboutViolence in Family
Mediation', in Margaret Thornton (ed), Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995,
174.
4 As Richard Posner points out, the idea ot welcomed harassment' is oxymoronic. See Carr v General Motors, 32 F3d 1007,
1008 (6th Cir. 1994).
Susan Estrich, 'Sex at Work' (1991) 43 Stanford Late Reieu, 813; Kathryn Abrams, 'Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory' (1995) 95 Colunbia Lan' Revicw 304.
6 Robinson vJackson'ille Slupyards, Inc., 760 FSupp. 1486, 1491 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal dismissed, Robinson vJacksonville
Slip yards, Inc., Case No. 91-3655 (U.S Court ofAppeals, 1 1th Cir.),Joint Stipulation of Dismissal (9 February 1995).
7 lbid, 1491.
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In the words of Howell W Melton, the federal judge who presided at the trial, '[p]ictures of
nude and partially nude women appear throughout the [shipyard] in the form of magazines, plaques
on the wall, photographs torn from magazines', and by virtue of advertising calendars, distributed by
the company.' In contrast, no pictures of male nudes were tolerated. (As one worker testified, were
someone to have a picture of a nude man, the worker would think that'son of a bitch' was 'queer'.)' j
Further, the company denied requests to post 'political materials, advertisements, and commercial
materials'.1" Indeed,'[b]ringing magazines and newspapers on the job [was] prohibited"1 - that is,
except pornographic magazines.
For the ten years in which she worked at the shipyards, Lois Robinson was confronted with
an array of incidents - such as finding explicit, pornographic pictures by her locker, at her work
station, or handed to her. Some of the pictures were of white women, some black. She found
graffiti on her locker - vivid, sexual imagery, directed at or implicating her. She suffered thousands
of small and large verbal and sometimes physical insults, as her co-workers pinched and grabbed her.
The district judge found more than a hundred facts, forming the predicate to his judgment
that Lois Robinson had been discriminated against because she was a woman - and further, that the
'sexualization of the workplace imposes burdens on women that are not borne by men'. Moreover,
to reach his conclusionJudge Melton decided that'the objective standard asks whether a reasonable
person of Robinson's sex, that is, a reasonable woman, would perceive' the comments she received to
be abusive. 3 No longer did that judge believe the phrase 'reasonable person' without further






13 Ibid, 1524 (emphasis added). The implications of a standard framed in terms of the reasonable woman are explored in
Kathryn Abrams, 'Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein' (1992)
41 DePaul Law Review 1021, 1037-38. An alternative test is proposed by economist-law professor Gillian K. Hadfield in
'RationalWomen:ATest for Sex-Based Harassment' (1995) 83 California Law Review 1151. For discussion of the role of
experts, see Martha Chamallas, 'Femimst Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Litigation' (1992) 1 TexasJournal ofWonen & Law 95. For the effects of gender on tort law standards, see Barbara
YWelke,'Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law ofAccidental Injury, 1870-1920' (1994) 19 Law and Social Inquiry 369.
Subsequent to the Robinson decision, the Umted States Supreme Court discussed sexual harassment claims in Harris v Forklift
Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993), and concluded that the inquiry centered around whether a work environment was
one 'that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive'The Court's test requires a factfinder to consider 'all the circumstances',
including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humilating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance! According to the
Court, psychological harm is a factor but none of the individual factors are required. Ibid, 371. While Forklift, 114 S. Ct. at 370-
71, described the standard both as an objective one from the standpoint of a 'reasonable person' as well as a subjective one (the
charging party must'perceive' the environment to be hostile or abusive), that decision has not necessarily precluded a formulation
that invokes a reasonable woman in a particular case. See, e.g. EEOC Notice 915.002, 8 March 1994, EEOC Compliance
Manual % 3114, 3115 (CCH) (using a reasonable person standard but also observing that the 'Court's decision [in Forklift] is
consistent with the Commission's view that a reasonable person is one with the perspective of the victim.').
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The Robinson case is important not only for its documentation of horrid facts and its explicit
incorporation of a woman's point of view in a legal rule. It is also important because of the claim
made by the defendant,Jacksonville Shipyards, when it appealed thejudgment 5 One of the grounds
raised for overturning the decision was that the offensive behavior is protected by constitutional
guarantees of free speech.16 For many years,TitleVII law had accrued with relatively little discussion
of the fact that (of course) Title VII affects speech, that Title VII regulates, limits, indeed punishes
some speech as well as some conduct in the workplace. But in these last few years (as exemplified by
the Jacksonville Shipyards' defense and now that of other defendants in Title VII cases), a line of
argument againstTitle VII relies on free speech claims.' 7
For example, the issue of the interaction between the First Amendment and Tide VII has
been a compelling topic for the American Civil Liberties Union. Within the last few years, the
National Board has revisited its policy twice. In 1993, after much debate, the National Board altered
its policy and concluded that'[w]here conduct or expression is sufficiently pervasive or intense that
its effect on a reasonable person in those particular circumstances would be to hinder significantly a
person from functioning as an employee or significantly adversely affect mental, emotional, or physical
well-being on the basis of sex', the behavior (including'conduct or expression') is actionable, although
in non-workplace settings, such conduct might not be actionable. 8 Soon thereafter, the policy was
under consideration again; the 1996 policy continues to insist on limiting the reach of its policy to
'5 Long after the appeal was filed in the early 1990s, a settlement occurred. See Robinson vJacksonville Shipyards, Inc., Case No.
91-3655 (U.S Court of Appeals, 11th Cir.),Joint Stipulation of Dismissal (9 February 1995) (noting that the dismissal is not
contingent on Jacksonville Shipyards' filing for bankruptcy, apparently a possibility at the time of dismissal). The Shipyards
closed in the early 1990s, and since then Jacksonville Shipyards have been embroiled in disputes with creditors, including
lawyers who had represented the Shipyards in 'labor and employment disputes.' Paul Dillon, 'Two More Sue Shipyards to
Collect Overdue Debts'Jacksonville Business Journal, 16 June 1995,Vol.10, No. 35, section 1. According to lawyers for the
parties in Robinson, the terms of the settlement are confidential (telephone interviews, February, 1996).
16 See Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union ('ACLU') Foundation of Florida, Inc. and American Civil
Liberties Union, Inc. at 5, 8, Robinson vJacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, No. 91-3655 (U.S. Court ofAppeals, 11th Cir.) (urging that TideVII's law on hostile work
environments be 'carefully crafted to reconcile the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech' and TildeVII rights;
Iexpressive activities cannot constitutionally be held to be unlawful "harassment" simply because of their offensiveness'). See
also BriefAmicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Congress in Support of Petitioner,
Harris v Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), No. 92-1168, U.S. Supreme Court (filedApril 30, 1993) (available in LEXIS,
Genfed library,'Briefs file') (urging that the 'effort to eradicate discrimination not ignore First Amendment rights'). See also
Diane Rado, 'ACLUs Capital Lobbyist Ousted', St. Petersburg Times, 3 March 1995 (discussing conflict between the ACLU
affiliate and the national office over what position to take in the Jacksonville Shipyards case).
7 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,'How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech' (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review 563, 567 (arguing that
the 'vagueness of harassment law means the law actually deters much more speech than might ultimately prove actionable');
EugeneVolokh,'Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment' (1992) 39 UCLA Law Review 1791, 1793,1871 (noting
that 'harassment law ... has faced remarkably few First Amendment challenges', and then arguing that, given TitleVII values,
only 'directed speech-offensive speech that is targeted at a particular employee because of the employee's race, sex, religion,
or national origin' be actionable).
'8 Policy No. 316,ACLU National Policies (Sexual Harassment in the Workplace).
19 Policy 316, as revised in April of 1995 by the ACLU National Board (on file with the author).
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workplaces, amplifies concerns for discrimination based on either 'sex or sexual orientation', and
shifts the focus to equality by describing the 'sexual conduct or expression' that is actionable as that
which is 'severe or pervasive enough to create unequal working conditions based on sex or sexual
orientation by, among other things, significantly hindering a reasonable employee in performing his
or herjob because of the employee's sex or sexual orientation or significantly harming the employee's
physical, mental, or emotional well-being because of the employee's sex or sexual orientation' 1
Thus, the first amendment questions compel attention from many institutions; moreover, the
effort to move the focus away from Lois Robinson and her legal right to be free from sexual
harassment to the question of free speech is not limited to TitleVII cases. 'Political correctness' is the
phrase used as an attack, when women of all colors and men of some colors bring up problems of
exclusion, of living with painful epithets, of being neither heard nor read.2 The argument advanced
is that freedom of expression - or great literature - is at stake, as if the excluded cultures were now
so powerful as to be able rapidly to undo accrued years of culture, tradition, books, and legal rules.
Notice the change in the subject. For a few brief moments, I was speaking about Lois
Robinson and her struggles as a worker, as a woman welder, and about the vicious aggression that
met her entry into the workplace. Now, I'm speaking about speech. How did that happen? Why
the switch in topics? What's so appealing about a First Amendment conversation that it can so
readily reframe the discussion?
The First Amendment is attractive because it appears to offer neutrality.21 We (legal scholars)
are also drawn to First Amendment discussions because they are so familiar, so comfortable, so easy.
We are, to be frank, in a safe conversation. To borrow my friend and colleague Carolyn Heilbrun's
terms, this is a very familiar plot. 22 Or as Annette Kolodny pointed out:
We read well, and with pleasure, what we already know how to read; and what we
know how to read is to a large extent dependent upon what we have already read
(works from which we developed our expectations and our interpretative strategies).
23
21 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, 'The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing,TenYears Later' (1992)
140 University qfPennsylvania Law Review 1349; Charles R. Lawrence III, 'Crossburning and the Sounds of Silence:
Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment' (1992) 37 Villanova Law Review 787; Charles R. Lawrence III, 'If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus' (1990) Duke Law Journal 431; Mari J. Matsuda,'Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story' (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320.
21 Stanley Fish (among others) has argued that the supposedly neutral stance of First Amendment discussion is not without its
own politics and its position. See, Stanley Fish, 'Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism and the First Amendment'
(1993) 64 University qf Colorado Lau Review 1061, 1070 ('it is ideology and politics all the way down'); Stanley Fish, There is
No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too, NewYork: Oxford Umversity Press, 1994,102-19
22 Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Writing a Wormans Life, NewYork:WW Norton, 1988, 27-47 ('There will be narratives of female lives
only when women no longer live their lives isolated in the houses and the stories of men.').
23 Annette Kolodny,'Dancing Through the Minefield' in Elaine Showalter (ed), The Neu; Feniinist Criticism: Essays on Wonen,
Literature, and Theory, NewYork: Pantheon, 1985, 144, 155.
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First Amendment conversations are deeply routine. We can quote Holmes, or James Madison; we
can invoke Nazi Germany or other totalitarian regimes. Our metaphors are ready made, we know
well the 'marketplace of ideas'. We know the intellectual moves, about whether particular terms are
- or are not -'fighting words' . 4 Has someone done the equivalent of yelling 'fire' in a crowded
theater?2 Is this parody, comedy, humor, political invective, literature or art?26 We know the boundaries;
we can be secure; we are not terribly likely to put our feet in our mouths.
The First Amendment is a distraction. The First Amendment offers us a way in which we can
feel some sense of engagement with contemporary problems, yet keep them at a safe distance. We
can be very busy (literally), arguing actual cases, writing speech codes or inveighing against them,27
debating and accusing - all the while cushioning the fact that we are actually at a loss for words (as
well as of ideas) when confronted with the stunning horror of the underlying stories.
Go back to Lois Robinson, who went into the Jacksonville Shipyards as one of'two female
skilled craftsworkers' among 960 men. She was confronted with a hostility that at least I, sitting far
from that place, have difficulty in fathoming. What was so awful about her entrance? What fear, of
what forms of integration, did her very presence prompt? What did her co-workers mean when
they called their employment 'more or less a man's world'.2' How did her presence - as a woman -
inspire so much hate? What was the imagined and real taboos that she breached? Why was she there
as one of so few woman welders?29 Why not in a clump of 25? (By the way, the same questions can
be asked in the context of the effort in 1995 by Shannon Faulkner, lone female, to enter the all-male
Citadel, the Military Academy of South Carolina.)3"
What kinds of structural changes should/may/could we impose to make the world a place in
which a woman could enter a new workplace, as a lone woman, and not fear physical and verbal
abuse? Are the 'we' here collectively much more willing to do so when the workplace is one connected
24 Chaplinsky v .cw Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
25 Schenck v United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2' See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment protects political cartoons, including
offensive parodies, as long as they are not reasonably believable).
27 See, e.g., American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v Hudnut, 771 E2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding unconstitutional an Indianapohs
ordinance, prohibiting the traffic in pornography and providing rights of action against it; concluding that defimtions of
pornography that referred to the 'the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women"' were too vague), summarily
affirmed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Doe v University qfMichigan, 721 F Supp. 852 (E. D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the
University's anti-discrimination policy, which included sanctions for discriminatory or racist verbal conduct or speech but
that varied by the location of the conduct at issue, violated the First Amendment);Thomas C. Grey,'Discrimsnatory
Harassment and Free Speech' (1991) 14 Harvard Journal of Lau) and Public Policy 157 (discussing his work as a drafter of the
Stanford University campus disciplinary code that regulated speech intended to insult or degrade specific individuals or a
small group, that was directly at them, and that used 'fighting words').
28 Robinson vJacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1493 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
21 'Women craftworkers are an extreme rarity'. Ibid, 1493.
30 See, Rene Sanchez,'Surprise, Understanding Meet Faulkner's Departure; Some Cite Her Status as Lonely, "Pioneer,"'
Washington Post, 19 August 1995,A14; Sheryl Stolberg,'Faulkner Hailed for Blazing a Lonely Trail to Citadel', Los Angeles
Tinies, 20 August 1995,A2; Susan Faludi,'Shannon Faulkner's Strength in Numbers', NewYork Tiies, 23 August 1995,A21.
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with blue collar workers than with upper class professionals?The footnote here is that Congress was,
until recently, totally exempt fromTitleVII,31 and that relatively few judicial systems have policies for
how to respond to allegations that a judge (rather than a staff member) is alleged to be a sexual
harasser.32
Moving from law to literature, note the problem of authorship, of who sets the contours of
the problem and generates the'relevant' context. Those who say we should be pursuing a conversation
about the First Amendment? Or those exploring the new plots offered out of the lives and experiences
of women? Women are now actually claiming not only a space in the conversation but authoritative
voice, to name the problem and require its redress, yet are finding that the discussion is moving away,
even as they gain a plank from which to speak.
We know how to tell First Amendment stories; their patterns are familiar. We have no
knowledge of what a world with powerful women resisting male advances can provide. Via Thomas
Hardy, we can peek at women like Sue Brideshead, insisting on a right of refusal.33 When we read
George Eliot's Daniel Deronda, we learn of a nineteenth century woman who declined motherhood.34
But where will those heroines, or Lois Robinson, take us?
Thus my first point is that contemporary law in the United States is filled with conflict over
who has control over both the underlying narratives and the resulting shape of legal doctrine, as well
as whether the culture will recognise, let alone explore, new plots. In the specific context of Title
VII, a concerted effort is underway to reassert the authority of a particular narrative voice by forcing
the story down familiar lines that both alter the focus and divert attention away from stunning
claims of hostility flowing toward individual woman and toward women collectively.
31 See Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3, to be codified at 2 USC ss 1301-1302 (making
TitleVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as other federal laws, applicable in some respects to the 'legislative branch of
the Federal Government,' one year after the date of enactment, which was January 23, 1995). Distinct remedial provisions
are provided, including mandatory counselling and mediation and an optional (but then exclusive) administrative/appellate
review process; the Equal Employment Opportunites Commission is not involved; damage actions against individual
members of Congress are not available. See 2 USC s 1401 et seq.; H.R. Rep. No. 841,103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6,1994), S.
Rep. No. 397, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 3,1994). Commentary critical of the remedial limits is provided by Robert Turner,
'Skirting the Law on Capitol Hill; Never Mind the "Contract", Congress Still Plays by Its Own Rules,' The Washington Post,
5 February 1995, C03. For discussion of constitutional questions about how members of Congress should be regulated
consistent with separation of powers doctrine, see Harold H. Bruff,'That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional
and Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress' (1995) 48 Arkansas Lis' Review 105.
32 See Lynn K. Rhinehart,'Is There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection Process', in 'Symposium, Gender,
Empiricism and the Federal Courts' (1994) 83 Georgetown LauwJournal 575, 595-96 (discussing the inapplicability of TildeVII
to the federal j udiciary); Marina Angel, 'Sexual Harassment byJudges' (1991) 45 University of Alianii Law Review 817
(providing an overview of the problems and proposing remedies).
33 Thomas HardyJude the Obscure, NewYork: Knopf, 1992 (first published in 1895);John Goode,'Sue Bridehead and the New
Woman', in MaryJacobus (ed) Wonen Writing and Writing About Wonien, London: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979, 101.
34 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 582-96 (first published in 1876).
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B. DESCRIBING THE COURTS
My second point is about a parallel on a larger scale - the narrative of courts themselves. In the
1960s and 19 70s, as litigators went to court to get legal protections for women, they noticed that
some of the pains of discrimination came from that very venue, courts. Some of the judges shared
the biases of the defendants. Stereotypes about women abounded, as judges upheld rules refusing
employment to women with small children3" or ignored claims of physical abuse.36
In response, the National Organization ofWomen's Legal Defense and Education Fund (itself
started in 1970) and the NationalAssociation ofWomenJudges (begun in 1979) joined together in 1980
to create a new organization -'the NationalJudicial Education Program to Promote Equality ofWomen
and Men in the Courts'- to educate judges about gender stereotyping.37 The short hand for this effort
became'gender bias in the courts'. The method of choice for education became the creation,jurisdiction
by jurisdiction, of task forces on gender bias in the courts. (The rationale for such jurisdiction-specific
work is that, when given concrete examples of discrimination, a judge would respond by explaining
that, while such a problem might exist in jurisdiction X, it was not a problem in his own jurisdiction.
These studies focus on particular jurisdictions, thus undercutting the plausibility of such claims.)
Over the past twenty years across the United States, courts have launched these projects -
about gender bias in the courts and about race and ethnic bias in the courts. Typically, such commissions
are chaired by judges and lawyers, and their studies are formally adopted by the courts themselves.
In 1988, the chief justices of all the state courts adopted a resolution in support of these efforts.3"
35 Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F2d 1, 4 (5th Cit. 1969) (holding that an employer, who would not hire women with
pre-school age children as an assembly trainee but would hire men with pre-school age children for that position, did not
violate TitleVII), vacated & renanded by 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
36 See, e.g., Nancy S. Erickson with Nadine Taub,'Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law"', (1990) 42 Rutgers
Law Review 309, 320-338 (a review, completed in 1985, of casebooks used in first year criminal law classes and of survey data
from those teaching that course; concluding that most courses did not address in any details issues such as spousal abuse and self-
defense and that the case law was similarly unfocused on women's experiences). Some of those stereotypes persist today,
exemplified by current case law describing questions addressed to victims of sexual assault. See, e.g., Catchpole v Brannon, 42 Cal,
Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. Ct.App. 1995) (reversing a trial judge who questioned a victim ofsexual assault by asking her what her father
thought of her lawsuit and whether she had considered attempting to escape without her clothes); other cases are described in
Lynn Hecht Schafran, 'Blinded by Rape Myths', The National Law Journal, 11 September 1995, A21; Lynn Hecht Schafran,
'Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist' (1993) 20 Fordharn Urban Law Journal 439.
17 See Lynn Hecht Schafran,'Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts:The Task Force Approach' (1987) 7 0Judicature 280
(current Director); Norma Juliet Wikler, 'On the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the
Courts' (1980) 64Judicature 202 (first Director). The two wrote a book providing advice about conducting such studies. See
Lynn Hecht Schafran and Norma Juliet Wilder, Operating a Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts: A Manualfor Action,
Washington, D.C.: Foundation forWomen, 1986.
31 Conference of ChiefJustices,'Resolution XVIII:Task Forces on Gender Bias and Minority Concerns' (1989) 26 Court
Review 5. In 1993, the Conference of ChiefJustices reaffirmed this position by calling not only for studies but also for
implementation of proposed reforms. Conference of ChiefJustices, Resolution Urging Further Efforts for Equal Treatment
of All Persons (adopted Jan. 28, 1993), reprinted in The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 'The Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force' (1994) 67 Southern California Law Review
1015 (hereinafter,'Ninth Circuit Report,The Effects of Gender').
in19
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The American Bar Association has sponsored meetings and created commissions devoted to these
issues. The Judicial Conference of the United States (the policy making body of the federal courts)
has endorsed these projects three times since 1992. 3" The net output - a new literature - includes
more than forty published reports, about thirty on gender, and a dozen on race and ethnicity.
40
Study after study shows widespread perceptions that the justice system is not uniformly fair,
that gender, race, and ethnicity have inappropriate effects on processes and outcomes. From states as
disparate as California, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and Minnesota, one learns that women seeking
redress for violence in the home are sometimes blamed, accused of provoking attacks, or treated as if
their experiences were trivial.4 Race reports provide parallel descriptions: people of color are more
likely to be held in custody after conviction than are whites, and evidence of racial disparities in
sentencing exist.42
Once again, celebration is in order. Women created a space as they told stories, both individual
and aggregate. This work has licensed thousands of conversations within the halls ofjustice. Out of
dozens of studies (built on social science empirical data and on individual accounts, repeated and
collected) came a new narrative. A now accepted statement - in public settings at least - by many
judges and lawyers in courts around the United States is that women suffer from the harms of
gender-based discrimination and those harms can reach even inside the courthouse doors.
Given that the Robinson case comes from Florida, I will use that state's report as an illustration.
The 1990 Report of the Florida Supreme Court's Gender Bias Study Commission concluded that 'the
3 See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 64 (Sept. 22, 1992); Report of the
Proceedings oftheJudicial Conference of the United States 28 (March 1993);Judicial Conference of the United States, Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts, December, 1995, 112-13 (Recommendation 78). On the history of these efforts, see Judith
Resnik,'Naturally Without Gender:Women,Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts' (1991) 66 New York University Lau Review
1682; for further analysis, see Judith Resnik, 'Asking About Gender in Courts' (1996) 21 Signs:Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 952.
'0 For a listing of these publications, see Resnik,'Asking About Gender in Courts', above n39 (appendix). Australian efforts
related to this issue are discussed in Kathy Mack, 'Gender Awareness in Australian Courts:Violence Against Women' (1994) 5
Criminal Law Forum 788.
4 See Judicial Council of California, Achieving EqualJustice for Women and Men in the Courts:The Draft Report of the Judicial
CouncilAdvisory Conmmittee ons Gender in the Courts, 1990, 4-5; Georgia Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System,
Gender and Justice in the Courts:A Report to the Supreme Court qf Georgia, 1991, 19-21; Kentucky Task Force on Gender
Fairness in the Courts, Equal Justice for Wonen and Men, 1992, 28; Maryland Special Joint Committee, Gender Bias in the
Courts: Report of the Special Joint Comssittee on Gender Bias in the Courts, 1989, 2-5; Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on
Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report, reprinted in (1989) 15 Willian Mitchell Lau Review 825, 872-77.
42 SeeThe D.C. CircuitTask Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 1 The Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force Project in the D. C.
Circuit, 1995, IVB-145 to IVB-146 [hereinafter D.C Circuit Task Force] ('after controlling for various factors, being African-
American and being male was significantly related to not being released "both at the initial hearing and at some time during the
pendency of their cases."'); Washington State Minority and Justice Task Force, Final Report, 1990, 10-11 ('perception that in
criminal proceedings, minorities receive disparate treatment and harsher sentences' despite sentencing guidelines). See also
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of the Connission on Systenic Racisfn in the
Ontario Crininal Justice Systens, 1995, 275, 280 ('white (30%) were alnost twice as likely as black (16%) convicted men to have
been released by the police' prior to trial;'judges were more likely to resort to imprisonment to punish black than white men',
when the length ofincarceration was calculated as including both pre-trial custody and post-trial custody).
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overwhelming weight of evidence and research ... [demonstrates that] gender bias permeates Florida's
legal system today' 43 The Florida report considered issues relating to family and criminal law, as
well as the legal profession. Specific findings ranged from concerns about divorce (that, while
Florida's 'no-fault' divorce statute was gender neutral in its language, judicial decisions were not;
rather, judges held the 'unrealistic assumption ... that men and women are economic equals in
present society')" to the criminal law ('women generally commit less serious offenses but are treated
more harshly than similarly situated male offenders')45 . As for the legal profession, Florida's task
force found that'[w]omen attorneys still encounter both flagrant and veiled antagonism throughout
the legal system', and that such antagonism *can influence the outcome of cases and client
relationships'.46 Other task force reports have considered issues ranging from bankruptcy to benefits
law, in part in an effort to make plain that laws relevant to women are not limited to those regulating
violence, the family, and bodies.47
A key to the task force literature is that women and men have very different comments on
the justice system, as do people of color when contrasted with whites. Women lawyers, in significantly
higher percentages than men lawyers, report that gender is a variable that shapes their careers, from
hiring to retention and promotion. Significantly higher percentages of women judges (be they trial
or appellate, in administrative tribunals or courts) report incidents in which they deem gender to be
relevant. In contrast, most male lawyers and judges report that gender has little or no effect, in a
courtroom or in a law firm, on process or on outcome.
48
Out of these many reports develops, if not a metanarrative, what Nancy Fraser has in other
contexts called'a medium level historical project' 4 that captures the views of some women who are
participants in the justice system. While one might have predicted that the male perspective would
simply be seen as neutral and 'true', and the female discounted, the opposite has occurred. Task force
reports - issued by judicial officials - accept as true the beliefs and perceptions of some women (by
and large lawyers and judges). Task forces move feminist criticism of the court from allegation to
fact.
Applause is in order; women have made power, forced unwilling individuals into conversations
and made a space for women to acknowledge pain, and then pushed men to state their appreciation
of women's distress. Unlike experiences of Nancy Miller within academic English literature, task
forces have succeeded somewhat in 'splitting the subject in power from the fascination of his own
4 Florida Supreme-Court Study Commission, Report ofthe Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 1990, 2.
A Ibid, 4.
4 A id, 12.
4' Ibid, 234. Credibility of women was of particular concern. The Commission heard repeated concern about male lawyers
and judges 'impugning the credibility of their female colleagues' and of women witnesses. lbid, 197-209.
4 See, e.g.,'Ninth Circuit Report,The Effects of Gender', above n38, 855-914; Resnsk,'Naturally Without Gender', above
n39; Regina Graycar,'Compensation for Loss of Capacity to Work in the Home', (1988) 10 Sydney Law Revi'w 528.
4 See, e.g.,'Ninth Circuit Report,The Effects of Gender', above n38, 950-5 1.
4 Nancy Fraser,'False Antitheses:A Response to Seyla Benhabib andJudith Butler' (1991) 11 Praxis International 166, 167.
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representation'."0 Similarly, task forces respond to Carol Smart's complaint about the law: that it
'disqualifies women's experiences of knowledge'."
This new narrative, in some ways tied to two hundred years of tradition and in some ways
innovative, has however recently come under assault. The authoritative voice gained by women and
men sharing their concerns that created institutional authorship for forty reports is now being
attacked, as efforts to undermine such voices are underway even as I write. Prominent critics
include Judge Lawrence Silberman of the District of Columbia's federal circuit court; he is described
in the press as'blast[ing] some of the findings' of the District of Columbia Circuit's federal task forces
and giving speeches explaining his and otherjudges on that circuit's 'disassociation' with this work.52
Such objectors are aided by women in an organization called the Independent Women's Forum 53
and by at least one history professor who has himself been the subject of debates often termed the
'cultural wars'." These opponents have attempted to block gender race task force efforts, in the
_judiciary, in bar association meetings, and in Congress.
In the summer of 1995, at the request of Senator Charles E. Grassley, a Republican from Iowa
who is on the Senate's Judiciary Committee, the General Accounting Office launched an'investigation'
of federal funds spent on these task forces. On 29 September 1995, Senator Grassley, joined by
Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Phil Gramm, engaged in a colloquy on the Congressional Record.1
5
Discussing appropriations for the judiciary, Hatch stated that studies on gender and race were:
ill conceived, deeply flawed and divisive ... [T]hey threaten the independence of the
Federal judiciary ... There are to be no funds expended on these studies in the future. 6
5' Nancy K. Miller, Getting Personal: Feminist Occasions and Other Autobiographical Acts, NewYork: Routledge, 1991, 64.
51 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, NewYork: Routledge, 1989, 2.
52 See, Bruce Brown,'Are Bias Reports Headed for Extinction?' Legal Times of Washington, 6 November 1995, 6; see also The
Honorable Lawrence H. Silberman, The D. C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias: Political Correctness Rebuffed,
The Federalist Paper, Federalist Society./or Law and Public Policy Studies, February 1996, 15, 22 (stating that '[t]his misconceived
effort should never have been launched in any circuit. It should be opposed everywhere.'). See also Statement of
Disassociation by Circuit Judges Buckley, Ginsburg and Randolph in The D.C Circuit Task Force, above n42, Pt.V-1 -V-8
(objecting to inquiries into 'non-court entities', to anonymous responses, and charging that the report is an effort to
mandate 'quota-conscious hiring' of law clerks).
53 See, e.g., Anita Blasr, of the Independent Women's Forum,'Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the District
of Columbia Circuit' (1994) 160 Federal Rules Decisions 169,194-195.
4 See Stephan Thernstrom, 'Critical Observations on the Draft Final Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias' in D.C. Circuit Task Force, above n42 ,V App. 1-1. Thernstrom, a
professor at Harvard, was the center of some controversy relating to his teaching of issues on race and ethnicity, a description
of the episode is provided in Dinesh D'Souza's book, illiberal Education:The Politics of Race and Sex on Canpus, New York:The
Free Press, 1991, 195-97 (D'Souza recounts that, upon reflection over the issue, Thernstrom described himself as feehng 'like
a "rape victim"').
5 Charles E. Grassley, Phil Gramm, and Orrin G. Hatch,'Colloquy on Gender Bias Studies', Congressional Record, 29 September
1995, S14691.
, Ibid.
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As of this writing, the future of federal funding for these projects remains in doubt.5
7
What is the objectors'plot line? What objections can be framed against these generally mild-
mannered efforts, supported by judiciaries and organised bar associations and written largely by
volunteer judges and lawyers, all in quest of improvements in the 'administration of justice'? Task
forces, the critics claim, violate 'our' traditions by creating'faction in a civil society'. Under this plot,
we (here, literally all of us) are equal before the law. Courts are blind to distinctions based on race,
color, gender, and/or ethnicity. Objectors accuse task forces that mark differences of making differences
by seeking special favor and undermining the impartiality of law. Echoing the commentary about
Ispeech police' that is being developed in the Title VII/First Amendment context, the objectors
claim that task forces pressure judges into 'politically correct' postures. -' In other words, the assaults
on task forces are from the same people hostile to other innovations aimed at enabling equality by
critical appraisals of the assumptions of formal equality. These opponents link gender, race, and
ethnic bias task forces to affirmative action and political correctness. "The arguments in these different
contexts echo each other - that naming differences between women and men creates differences,
that affirmative action creates prejudice rather than responds to it.
Hence, at both doctrinal level and at the systemic level of courts, a genuine shift has occurred
in the last two decades in the United States. In both arenas, women's voices produced a counter-
narrative; they detailed through law the existence of harms. Women also began to elaborate, by
exploring the interplay among and between women of all colors, sexual orientations, ages, and
classes, that they were by no means singular and univocal but have multiplicities complicating any
s After that Grassley-Gramm-Hatch colloquy on the Senate floor, the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts voted to seek additional funds from Congress to continue the task force work. But, according to press
reports, ChiefJustice Rehnquist reviewed the matter with the head of the Administrative Office, and then a decision was
made 'not to appeal the deletion' of federal funding for bias task forces. Bruce D. Brown,'Judiciary Won't Fight for Court
Bias Studies', LegalTitnes of Washington, 13 November 1995, 1. The appropriations bill that formed the basis for these
exchanges was vetoed for other reasons. See, Bruce D. Brown,'Judiciary's Stopgap Funds Running Dry', Legal Times, 1
January 1996, 1 (the Federal judiciary's spending bill is 'packaged with the appropriations measures for the departments of
Commerce, State, and Justice', which President Clinton vetoed).
In the interim, nine democratic Senators, Paul Simon, Edward Kennedy, Joseph Biden, John Kerrey, Bill Bradley, Dale
Bumpers, Barbara Boxer, Frank Lautenberg, and John Glenn, and at least one member of the House (Constance Morella,
Maryland) 'counter-colloquied' - expressing their support for federal task force work and reminding everyone that there is
actually enacted legislation - The Violence Against Women Act - supporting these projects. 141 Cong. Rec. S18173,7
December 1995; 141 Cong. Rec. E2302, 6 December 1995. The judiciary then received continuing funds; the issue remains
as to how the life-tenured judges will spend their moneys in light of the hostility expressed about these projects by the
(current) majority party in Congress.
s Indeed one ofJudge Silberman's anti-task force speeches is entitled:'The D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and
Ethnic Bias: Political Correctness Rebuffed', and he refers to the task forces' proposals for judicial education about gender
issues as 're-education'. Silberman,'Political Correctness Rebuffed', above n52, 7.
5 Stanley Fish,'How the Right Hijacked the Magic Words', Nei York Tines 13 August 1995, Section 4, 15 (discussing how the
'eye is deflected from the whole - history, culture, habitats, society - and the parts, now freed from any stabilizing context,
can be described in any way one likes' and that the success of this strategy relies on appropriation of'the vocabulary of
America's civil religion ... equal opportunity, color-blindness, race neutrality, and, above all, individual rights.').
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simplifying plots.6 Women made space, achieved stature, offered new stories that shifted the frames
of reference. And plainly this power scared a lot of people. That fear is not beyond understanding;
it is unnerving because none of us (feminist or not) know how it will end.
C. MAPPING A FIELD: LAW AND LITERATURE
A third arena, and the one with which I will conclude, is the subject of the symposium that prompted
this comment - Law and Literature. What is its relationship to these feminist narratives and the
counter-narratives that I have just outlined?
For description of United States 'law and literature', summations are available from a
variety of sources, including from one of the symposium's conveners, Richard Weisberg,6 as well by
participants Gary Minda' 2 and Robert Weisberg.63 A different kind of insight into the field comes
from Elizabeth Gemmette, who provides (like gender, race, and ethnic bias task forces) a window
into the daily, ordinary practice of law and literature.64 Gemmette seeks to understand the effect that
concerns going under the rubric of law and literature have had on legal education in the United
States. To do so, she has twice sent survey questionnaires to law schools and thus provides us with a
thick description of what practitioners assign as readings and describe as their primary teaching
goals. Her approach enables insight into what people think they are doing when they 'do' law and
literature in the United States,"5 and I am grateful for her work.
Given Gemmette's data, feminist problems abound with the shape of the body called Law and
Literature. A first, and obvious, point is about representation and voice. It is not news that literature
60 A much richer discussion exists in feminist theory than is enacted in the law directly. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw,
'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color' (1991) 43 Stanford Lau,
Review 1241;Trina Grfflo,'Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality:Tools to Dismantle the Master's House' (1995) 10 Berkeley
Women's Law Journal 16;Trina Grillo & Stephanie M.Wildman, 'Obscuring the Importance of Race:The Implication of
Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or other -isms)' (1991) 1991 Duke Law Journal 397;Angela P Harris,
'Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theory' (1990) 5 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 181;Angela P. Harris, 'Race and
Essentialism in Femimst Legal Theory' (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581;Angela P. Harris,'Women of Color in Legal
Education: Representing La Mestiza' (1991) 6 Berkeley Women's LauJournal 107.
(1 Richard Weisberg, PoettJics and other Strategies of Lau' and Literature, NewYork: Columbia, 1992 [hiereinafter, Poethics]. A review
of his approach is provided in Thomas Morawetz, 'Ethics and Style:The Lessons of Literature for Law' (1993) 45 Stanford
Law Review 497.
62 Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movemients, NewYork and London: NewYork University Press, 1995, 149-166 (Chapter 8
entitled 'Law and Literature' distinguishing between 'literary jurisprudence' and 'narrative jurisprudence').
63 Robert Weisberg,'The Law-Literature Enterprise', (1988) 1 Yale Journal Lau and Humanities 1,2-3 (critical of the law-
literature scholarship because of its 'overly conventional readings of literature' and its 'complacent understanding of law').
64 Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette,'Law and Literature:Joining the Class Action' (1995) 19 Valparaiso University Law Review 665
[hereinafter, Gemmette,'Joining the Class Action']; Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, 'Law and Literature An Unnecessarily
Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum' (1989) 23 Valparaiso Lau Review 267.
65 For example, in 1993, Gemmette sent questionnaires to 199 law schools in the United States; 84 reported offering some
kind of law and literature course, while 111 reported not doing so. Gemmette, 'Joining the Class Action,' above n64, 666.
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and law have long been allies; both have worked - separately and together, via canonised texts and
legal rules, to suppress and make silent much of the world inhabited and understood by women.
Women literally lacked juridical voice. Until quite recently, women were the objects of the discussion,
as property, as victims, as defendants, but not the authors, the speakers, the witnesses, the lawyers, the
judges, or the jurors.
But there is also a sustained counter-narrative, in both law and literature and the intersection
thereof, comprised of a rich array of readings and commentaries. Feminist theory in literature and
feminist theory in law are both contexts in which a host of professors specialise, and have done so for
more than a decade. Yet here, with a relatively new course in law schools called'Law and Literature',
coming into its own at just the point in time when literary criticism is filled with questions of the
canon, 66 here, once again, women are almost invisible.
6
1
Reviewing the 1995 summary provided by Gemmette, twenty-two works of non-fiction are
assigned or recommended by teachers three or more times; only one is authored by a woman
(PatriciaWilliams). 68The remaining twenty-one works are by men; Richard Posner, current president
of the American Law and Economics Association, heads the citation list. 69 Moreover, given the focus
on Richard Posner, the absence of one woman in particular - RobinWest - is all the more surprising.
As Posner describes, his interest in law and literature was first engaged when reading one of Robin
66 According to Gemmette,'Joining the Class Action,' above n64, at 666, 38 law schools reported teaching law and literature
courses in the 1980s, while 84 describe themselves as doing so in the early 1990s.
67 1 find insufficient Richard Weisberg's suggestion that the addition of books by a few women novelists to the group of great
works (e.g., Billy Budd, Bleak House) provides the 'central feminist questions.' Richard Weisberg, Poethics, above n61, 119-20.
I prefer not only to be seen through the lens of men's description but also to be heard from directly; of equal import, the
issues are not simply access and inclusion, but the introduction of new plots and the resulting transformations.
68 Gemmette, Joining the Class Action', above n64, 671, n. 46 (Williams assigned or recommended on five lists). Compare
Susan Sage Heinzelman and Zipporah BatshawWiseman (eds), Representing Women: Law, Literature, and Femninisni, Durham:
Duke University Press, 1994 (anthology of readings);Jacqueline St. Joan and Annette McElhiney (eds) Beyond Portia:A
Femfinist Reader on Law and Literature (forthcoming, Northeastern U. Press, 1997).
69 Gemmette,'Joining the Class Action', above n64, 671, n. 46 (Posner's work cited 13 times; Henry David Thoreau follows
with eight citations, followed by references to Richard Weisberg and James Boyd White). While Judge Posner has written a
book about the subject (Richard Posner, Law and Literature:A Misunderstood Relation, Cambridge: Oxford Umversity Press,
1988), its critical reception makes odd that he, an economist who aims to explain the limited utility of literary thought for
law, is given so much authority by practitioners of law and literature. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, 'Don't Know Much about the
Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature' (1988) 99 Yale Law Journal 777;J.M. Balkin, 'The Domestication of Law and
Literature', (1989) 14 Lau) & Social Inquiry 787; Robert Weisberg,'The Law-Literature Enterprise', above n63, 22-32; 47-51.
Both Fish and Balkin argue that Posner writes in an effort to deflect the power of the interdisciplinary work of law and
literature and to reassert the authority of law and economics within legal discourse. For example, Balkin argues that
'Posner's strategy ... is to reinterpret literature and literary theory in a way that is not relevant to political and social issues
... Thus, the most interesting thing about Lau and Literature:A Misunderstood Relation by Richard Posner is how the book
uncannily reenacts its own title-how the relation of law and literature is systematically misunderstood by Richard Posner'.
Balkin, above, 799-800.
71 See Posner, Lau and Literature, above n69, iv., citing to Robin West,'Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:The Role of Consent
in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner' (1986) 99 Harvard Lauw Review 384.
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West's essays, 0 andWest and Posner have since been in an extended conversation about the relationship
between law and literature.
One other oddity in current courses is worth noting. Gemmette describes a change over the
last half dozen years. The contours of what she terms an 'emerging Law and Literature Canon' (as
contrasted with the 'Established Canon') are evident in assignment of works of fiction, such as Susan
Glaspell's short story, A Jury of Her Peers,2 and the novels Beloved byToni Morrison and The Handmaid's
Tale by Margaret Atwood, as well as in other fiction works, 'mentioned only once or twice' by law
and literature teachers and mostly by women. 3 Yet compare again the list of non-fiction works:
women as professors of the metier, as critics, as shaping the discourse remain unrecognised as
authoritative by teachers of the domain.
A second problem relates to the purposes of law and literature, as important a question today
as when Carolyn Heilbrun and I wrote several years ago.74 According to Gemmette's overview, law
professors report that their efforts to teach law students literature are based either on a desire to find
literary depictions of lawyers and the legal system - and thereby to understand law, or to teach law-
as-literature, as texts to be critiqued and analyzed - and thereby also to understand law. Thus, what
Carolyn Heilbrun and I described in 1990 as the two identities of law and literature (what we called
'law in literature' or 'law as literature')75 remain central today. When asked the 'why' of their courses
by Gemmette, law professors explained that their principle reasons for teaching law and literature
were to expose students to grand literary style, make them critical readers, contemplate the power
and morality ofjudges and lawyers,prepare them to understand the human condition, and to strengthen
humanities within law schools.7 6 (Teaching about women made the list of purposes in 1995 as the
thirteenth rationale out of fourteen.)
77
71 Richard A. Posner,'The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West' (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 1431;
Robin West, 'Submission, Choice, and Ethics:A Rejoinder to judge Posner' (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 1449; RobinWest,
'Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast' (1988) 39 Mercer Law Review 867.
72 Susan Glaspell,'Ajury of Her Peers,' reproduced in Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and judith Resnik, Procedure, Westbury,
NewYork: Foundation Press, 1988, 1167-85 (short story, written in 1917, and detailing two women's understandings of the
events surrounding the murder of a man, allegedly by his wife, as contrasted to the 'evidence' uncovered by the male
investigators).
7' Gemmette,'Joining the Class Action', above n64, 686-88,691.
74 Heilbrun & Resnik, 'Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism', above n2.
11 lAid, 1936.
76 Gemmette,'Joining the Class Action', above n64, 671-72. Professor Robin West describes James Boyd White as the chief
aspirant of the cultured lawyer. See Robin L.West, Law, Literature, and Feminism (manuscript at 5-8, forthcoming in
Robert Munro,'Femnist Jurisprudence,Women and the Law Bibliography' and in McGeorge Law Review) (discussingJarnes
B.White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and
Company, 1973;James Boyd White, Actsof Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1994.) A reading of literature less cheerful than White's is put forth by Richard H.Weisberg in
The Failure of the Word, The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction, New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1984.
7 Gemmette, joining the Class Action', above n64, 672.
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What a lopsided hierarchy, with literature in the service of law. I do not see literature as the
'handmaiden' (a word chosen deliberately) of law but on equal footing. I bring literature to law
students to show them what lawyers cannot yet imagine: stories that law has yet to invent, rights yet
to be seen, and how to cope with problems seen but that stymie us by their pain. We (here, law
professors and our students) need to read Alice Walker's Advancing Luna- and Ida B. Wells78 to help
think about rape law, which cannot be revised without remembering not only the distrust of women
that it reflects but also that United States' history is filled with accusations that men of color have
raped white women. 9 We need to readJude the Obscure to understand laws about sexual aggression,
to consider under what conditions a woman saying no to sex might ever be heard.8 We need to see
the brilliant film, A Question of Silence, to understand the pervasive modes by which men dominate
women, and to consider how much to be a part of legal institutions, when to stand outside them,
and when to laugh.81
Yet a third example of feminist problems with 'law and literature' are the texts of law - relied
upon both by law professors (to teach 'what law is about' to new generations of lawyers) and by
English professors (to write about what literature and law have in common). 2 For many (but not
all)83 English professors who do 'law and literature', the principle texts are authored by very few
actors: Supreme Court justices in particular, appellate judges in general, and sometimes members of
Congress or their staff. These are the pronouncements that, in theory, bind the nation. The choice
of text assumes, reiterates, and affirms the primacy of those who are currently hierarchically superior
and further assumes that the hierarchy is itself fixed - and appropriate.
But other speakers are critical in law: lawyers, speaking through documents that they draft;
judges of the lower courts; witnesses in depositions or in trial transcripts; court staff who are key to
entry and participation. Indeed, gender, race, and ethnic bias task force reports are full of testimony
by these many participants. Further, to the extent law and literature proponents stay within the texts
generated at the highest courts, one hears from a singular set of actors, positioned by class, race,
ethnicity, and gender. In contrast, as is well known today in part by CourtTV and the ubiquitous OJ
Simpson trial, Marcia ClarkJohnny Cochran, and Mark Fuhrman are also voices in courts that form
7 Alice Walker, 'Advancing Luna - and Ida B.Wells' in You Can't Keep a Good Woman Down, San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1981, 85.
'9 See, e.g.,Adele Logan Alexander, 'She's No Lady, She's a Nigger": Abuses, Stereotypes, and Realites from the Middle
Passage to Capital and (Anita) Hill', in Anita Faye Hill and Emma Coleman Jordan (eds), Race, Gender, and Power in America:
The Legacy of the Hill-Thomas Hearings, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 3-20.
8 HardyJude the Obscure, above n33.
s A Question qfSilence (Quartet Film Inc., Marleen Gorris, director, 1986).
'2 See, e.g., Robert Ferguson,'TheJudicial Opinion as Literary Genre' (1990) 2 Yale Journal ofLaw and Humanities 201;Judith
Resnik,'Constructing the Canon' (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law and Humnanities 221.
83 See, e.g., Brook Thomas, Plessy v Ferguson:A BriefHistory with Documents, NewYork: Bedford Books (forthcoming Fall 1996);
Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (eds), Law Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, New Haven, London:Yale University
Press, (forthcoming 1996).
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the basis of law. For literature to study law as if the texts were only Supreme Court opinions is to
miss a lot of law.
Note that here I am not making a claim at all about hearing so-called'outsiders' voices. My
point is that, by reading only the pronouncements from on high, one misses hearing insiders, key
actors currently in the plot.84 Further, it is the behavior and activities of these speakers and those
who hear them that constitute part of law, as much as law is constituted by jurisprudential fiat."5
Feminism in law and feminist theory in literature have much to bring to the practice of law
and literature within the legal academy. Given that law and literature is coming of age within the
legal academy as both the disciplines of law and of literature are much engaged with canonicity, the
fledgeling project 'law and literature' (itself something of an 'outsider' 6 ) could be the source of lively
contributions to such debates. Yet this domain seems as traditional as those it seeks to supplement. A
feminist counter-narrative exists, at the periphery, as does a plentitude of discussions about the role
of narrative in law and the legitimacy of what some term 'outsider narratives' " Here too the
struggle for authority to speak dominates these last few years of the century.
In each of these domains - in legal doctrine, in the construction of the self-descriptions of
courts, and in the conscious crafting of an interdisciplinary field of study - the tension remains
constant about a struggle for the meaning of meaning. That such struggle exists is evidence that law
and literature are both engaged in the practice of power, and it is that shared enterprise that binds
them so tightly together.
8' See, e.g., Resnik,'Constructing the Canon', above n82 (upon reading lower court as well as Supreme Court opinions,
literary interpretation of Supreme Court opinions needs to be revised to consider the ways in which justices' voices are not
only 'interrogative, monologic, declarative' and freighted with inevitability but also how such opinions are recreations and
sometimes distortions of narratives in assistance of their advocacy).
85 See Robert M. Cover,'Foreword: Notios and Narrative' (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4 (discussing the 'jurisgenerative' role
of communities and how courts, as instruments of the state, can be 'jurispathic');John Frow,'Comments on Steven Mailloux,
MeasuringJustice in Legal and Literary Theory' (presentation at the Symposium, manuscript on file with author, 30
September 1995) (discussing the role of law as bridging relations among the living and the dead).
86 West,'Law, Literature, and Feminism', above n76, manuscript at 2-4 (comparing law and literature's marginal status to that of
law and economics, now considered a necessary part of the education of lawyers in the United States).
87 Some of the work about such 'outsider' voices might also be understood as a part of classes or scholarship about law and
literature. This set of writings is much concerned with the role of narrative and the issue of what stories have authoritative
character. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams,'On Hearing the Call of Stories' (1991) 79 California Law Review 971 (describing
feminist narratives, the critiques of them, and offering a rich analysis of the challenges posed); Susan Bandes, 'Empathy,
Narrative, andVictim Impact Statements' (1996) 63 University qf Chicago Law Review (forthcoming, 1996) (examining the
relationship between calls for narrative and claims for empathy in judging and distinguishing among the kinds of empathic
responses the law should provide).
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